第七届中国经济学年会论文专场综述：微观经济学Ⅰ

　　杨其静  《监督与建议：董事会功能的新认识》

　　这篇论文最大的创新之处在于发掘董事会的另一个新作用：建议作用，并且探讨在何种情况下董事会的监督作用与建议作用能够得到最大的发挥。其核心问题：董事会为什么存在？董事会质量如何被提高？经典委托代理理论回答了第一个问题，而第二个问题又可以被归结为什么样的董事会制度与结构才能保证董事会对管理层的有效监督。作者认为经典理论只认证了董事会的监督职能而忽视了其建议职能。因此拓展方向为：把董事列为管理层的一员，可以通过向管理层提出建议来改进生产经营活动从而提高股东价值。在方法论上，本文运用了实证研究方法与计量回归的方法，并且结合博弈论的思想，得到以下结论：只要董事会对CEO的监督强度足够小，CEO的权益性收入比重足够大，CEO才有动力向企业提供真实的信息，从而获得董事会的建议并且提高股东价值。通过比较国企与家庭企业，作者发现，外生强化的国企董事会更多地具有监督功能，而内生强化的家庭企业更多地具有建议功能。通过对目前各企业的独立董事来源与分布的比较，作者发现，我国上市公司董事会普遍缺乏真正意义上的建议功能，其主要来源是高校学术机构及专业性行业机构不足以应付多元化独立董事的要求，因而建议功能被大大弱化。

　　李玲芳 《reputation, trust and rebates: how online auction markets can improve their feedback mechanisms》

　　这篇论文研究如何改进网上市场的反馈系统来维持网络市场的健康发展。网络市场运用其基于用户之间的反馈系统来监督网络欺诈和投机行为。但是目前反馈系统存在着信息不完全的问题限制了互联网市场的发展。本文提出了创新的激励机制来解决反馈系统信息不完全的问题。 运用方法：博弈论。在纯逆选择模型下，诚信型的卖方与买方都会选择激励机制，买方就会提供反馈信息，从这些信息里面我们可以逆推哪些是诚信型的卖方，哪些是欺诈型的卖方。在混合模型下，欺诈型的卖方会选择激励机制，而且会付出努力去减少欺诈行为。同时， 本文还进一步讨论了卖方更换用户名的情况与具体的激励机制。

　　What this paper research is that how to sustain healthy internet market by improving information feedback system. Internet market supervise cheating and speculative activities by information feedback system among netusers. But the current system is hindered by insufficient information. the paper propose innovative inspiration mechanism to solve this problem. The method we use is game theory. In a pure choice model, sellers and buyers with concern of reputation will choose inspiration mechanism, and buyers will provide feedback information. we can conversely identify those sellers who concern their reputation. In a combined model, fraud sellers will choose inspiration mechanism and pay effort to diminish cheating activities. At the same time, the idiographic inspiration mechanism forms and the situation with sellers change username frequently will be discusses further.

　　郭明  《Dynamic Strategic Informed Trading With Risk-averse Market Makers》

　　This paper presents an infinite horizon asset pricing model with strategic informed trading and competitive risk-averse market makers. This model may explain several financial anomalies. When market makers are risk-averse, we find that trading cost and market impact cost slow down the trading of the informed trader and thus contribute to the short-term positive autocorrelation of stock returns (momentum), that the underreaction of liquidity traders to public news and the momentum trading of the informed trader may explain the short-term post-earnings drift, that the risk-aversion of the informed trader as well as others contribute to the long-term negative autocorrelation of stock returns (reversal) and to long-term opposite post-earnings drift, and that the variation in liquidity premium contributes to the ``excess volatility" puzzle. When the market makers are risk-neutral, none of the above puzzle exists. The model also specifies testable forms for price resiliency and market depth.

　　郑兵勇　《A theory of horizontal mergers》

　　Empirical research on mergers and acquisitions has revealed some stylized facts of merger activity over the last century. First, mergers occur in waves. Second, mergers concentrate in industries for which a regime change of technological shock or regulation shift can be identified. Third, some empirical studies suggest that the average return to acquirers in mergers in average are negative in short-run. In this paper "A theory of horizontal mergers", the authors consider a model of horizontal mergers between Cournot firms with quadratic cost functions, and try to reconcile some of the most important stylized facts about merger and acquisition activities over the last century.The main result of their study in this paper are as follow: when cost-saving from the merger is high or market demand is very price elastic, there is an incentive for firms to merge. In addition, mergers can be increasingly profitable as more and more mergers have taken place. This implies that mergers tend to occur in waves. On the other hand, the threat of potential entry puts a brake on mergers that would otherwise be profitable.