第七届中国经济学年会论文专场综述：微观经济学Ⅱ

Liu Fen　《Elementary Analysis of Routine Incentive Policies in R&D Department》

　　This paper investigates two kinds of routine incentive policies, one is to fix the number of prizewinners and the other one is to fix the standard of prize-giving, in R&D departments with agents subject to present environment and immediate emotions in the form of a time-inconsistent utility. One conclusion for the policy with fixed number of prizewinners is that the principal should be cautious of his team’ size even if he can adopt this policy in his team. When it comes to the policy with fixed standards of prize-giving, sometimes the principal should not stubbornly adhere to this policy, and even if the principal can adopt this policy with his team, sometimes he should renew his policy every three periods, sometimes he should keep a stiff upper lip with his policy.

Hongjun Zhong《Competition Between Differentiated Sellers:Exploding and Open Offers》

　　This paper study competition with exploding offer and open offers between differentiated sellers in a simple model. The author found that sellers prefer the strong seller moves first with exploding offer to open offer. But if offer is known to be exploding, then both sellers prefer to be a follower. However, strong seller can always manage to lobby weak seller to wait and pay some compensation and there is always an exploding offers equilibrium in which strong seller makes offer first. This finding explains why in the labor market big companies often make recruit decision first. This study also sheds some new light on the recent work on the competition between sellers.