Four Lectures on Auction Theory E. Maskin
Wuhun University
May 12-15
Lecture 1: standard auctions, revenue equivalence, and revenue maximization
Lecture 2: risk aversion and correlation
Lecture 3 :asymmetric auctions
Lecture 4: efficient auctions
reading list：
J. Crémer and R. McLean (1985), “Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discrimminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent,” Econometrica, 53, 345-361.
P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin (2001), “Efficient Auctions,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 341-388.
E. Maskin and J. Riley (2000), “Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,”Econometrica, 52, 1473-1518.
E. Maskin and J. Riley (2000), “Asymmetric Auctions,” Review of Economic Studies, 67, 439-454.
E. Maskin (2002), “Auctions and Efficiency,” in M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky (eds.), Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press.
P. Milgrom and R. Weber (1982), “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, 50, 1089-1122.
R. Myerson (1981), “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 58-73.
W. Vickrey (1961), “Counterspeculation, Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance, 16, 8-37.
拍卖理论在经济理论和实践中都具有非常重要的意义。
《拍卖理论》的教材中心有买的
reading list中的论文不久可以到中心复印。
