一些信息经济学文献

观点 · 2003-08-08

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1. Akerlof, George A., " The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism  ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), ao?t 1970, pages 488-500.
2. Allais, Maurice, " Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine ", Econometrica, 21 (4), octobre 1953, pp. 503-546.
3. Anscombe, F. et R. Aumann, " A Definition of Subjective Probability ", Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34 (1), mars 1963, pp. 199-205.
4. d'Aspremont, Claude et Louis-André Gérard-Varet, " Incentives and Incomplete Information ", Journal of Public Economics, 11, 1979, pp. 25-45.
5. Baron, David P. et Roger B. Myerson, " Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs ", Econometrica, 50 (4), juillet 1982, pp. 911-930.

6. Bernoulli, Daniel, " Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk ", Econometrica, 22 (1), janvier 1954, pp. 23-26. Cet article est une traduction de l'article original publié en 1738.
7. Blackwell, David, " Equivalent Comparison of Experiments ", Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 24 (2, juin 53, pp. 265-272.
8. Clarke, Edward H., " Multipart Pricing of Public Goods ", Public Choice, 11, automne 1971, pp. 17-33.
9. Ellsberg, Daniel, " Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75 (4), novembre 1961, pp. 643-669.
10. Farrell, Joseph et Rabin, Matthew, " Cheap Talk ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (3), été 1996, pp. 103-118.

11. Farrell, Joseph, " Information and the Coase Theorem ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (2), hiver 1987, pp. 113-129.
12. Geanakoplos, John, " Common Knowledge ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (4), automne 1992, pp. 53-82.
13. Gibbard, Allan, " Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result ", Econometrica, 41 (4), juillet 1983, pp. 587-601.
14. Groves, Theodore, " Incentives in Teams ", Econometrica, 41 (4), juillet 1983, pp. 617-631.
15. Guesnerie, Roger et Jean-Jacques Laffont, " A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm ", Journal of Public Economics, 25, 1984, pp. 329-369.

16. Grossman, Stanford J. et Oliver D. Hart, " An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem ", Econometrica, 51 (1), janvier 1983, pp. 7-45.
17. Holmstrom, Bengt et Roger B. Myerson, " Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information ", Econometrica, 51 (6), novembre 1983, pp. 1799-1819.
18. Jewitt, Ian, " Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems ", Ecnometrica, 56 (5), septembre 1988, pp. 1177-1190.
19. Knight, Frank Hyneman, Risk, uncertainty and profit, 1933.
20. Kihlstrom, Richard E., " A Bayesian'' exposition of Blackwell's theorem on the comparison of experiments ", dans Bayesian Models in Economic Theory, édité par Marcel Boyer et Richard E. Kihlstrom, North-Holland, volume 5, chapitre 2.

21. Lewis, Tracy R. et Sappington, David E., " Countervailing Incentives in Agency Problems ", Journal of Economic Theory, 49 (2), 1989, pp. 294-313.
22. Machina, Mark J.,"  Choice Under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (1), été 1987, pp. 121-154.
23. Matthews, Steven et John Moore, " Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening ",, Ecnometrica, 55 (2), mars 1987, pp. 441-467.
24. Mc Afee, Preston R. et John McMillan, " Analyzing the Airwaves Auction ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10 (1), hiver 1996, pp. 159-175.
25. Milgrom, Paul et John Roberts, " Price and Advertising Signals of Product Quality ", Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), ao?t 1986, pp. 786-821.

26. Milgrom, Paul, " Auctions and Bidding: A Primer ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 3 (3), été 1989, pp. 3-22.
27. Myerson, Roger B. et Mark A. Satterthwaite, " Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading ", Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 1983, pp. 265-281.
28. Pratt, John W., " Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large, ", Econometrica, 32 (1/2), janvier-avril 1964, pp. 122-136.
29. Raiffa, Howard, " Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms: Comment ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75 (4), novembre 1961, pp. 690-694.
30. Ramsey, Frank Plumpton (1926), " Truth and Probability ", dans The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays, édité par R. B. Braithwaite, Harcourt Brace and Company, New York, 1931.

31. Rothschild, Michael et Stiglitz, Joseph E., " Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), novembre 1976, pages 630-649.
32. Predengast, Canice, " The Provision of Incentives in Firms ", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVII, juin 1999, pp. 7-63.
33. Rogerson, William P., " The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems ", Econometrica, 53 (6), novembre 1985, pp. 1357-1368.
34. Sandmo, Agnar, " Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13 (1), hiver 1999, pp. 165-180.
35. Salop, Steven C. " Evaluating Uncertain Evidence With Sir Thomas Bayes: A Note for Teachers ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (1), été 1987, pp. 155-159.

36. Savage, Leonard J., The Foundations of Statistics, Wiley, New York, 1954.
37. Spence, Michael, " Job Market Signaling ", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), ao?t 1973, pages 355-374.
38. Starmer, Chris, " Developments in Non-Expected Utility Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice under Risk ", Journal of Economic Literature, XXXVIII, juin 2000, pp. 332-382.
39. Thaler, Richard H., et William T. Ziemba, " Anomalies: Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (2), printemps 1988, pp. 161-174.
40. Thaler, Richard H., " Anomalies: The Winner's Curse ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, <">2 (1), hiver 1988, pp. 191-202.

41. Townsend, Robert M., " Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification ", Journal of Economic Theory, 21 (2), 1979, pp. 265-293.
42. Tversky, Amos et Thaler, Richard H., " Anomalies: Preference Reversals ", Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (2), hiver 1990, pp. 201-211.
43. Vickrey, William, " Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders  ", Journal of Finance, 16 (1), mars 1961, pp. 8-37.


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