Group Lending with Adverse Selection
观点 · 2004-07-06
返回
Abstract
We focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending. In a simple static model we show that there is no collateral eect if borrowers do not know each other. If the borrowers know each other, group lending implements e cient lending. However, it is not robust to collusive behavior, when transfers are allowed between colluding partners. Finally, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof group contract.
We focus on adverse selection as a foundation of group lending. In a simple static model we show that there is no collateral eect if borrowers do not know each other. If the borrowers know each other, group lending implements e cient lending. However, it is not robust to collusive behavior, when transfers are allowed between colluding partners. Finally, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof group contract.
123
123
